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THE MATHEMATICAL INTELLIGENCER FLUNKS
THE OLYMPICS
ALEXANDER E. GUTMAN, MIKHAIL G. KATZ, TARAS S. KUDRYK,
AND SEMEN S. KUTATELADZE
Abstract. The Mathematical Intelligencer recently published a
note by Y. Sergeyev that challenges both mathematics and intelli-
gence. We examine Sergeyev’s claims concerning his purported In-
finity computer. We compare his grossone system with the classical
Levi-Civita fields and with the hyperreal framework of A. Robin-
son, and analyze the related algorithmic issues inevitably arising in
any genuine computer implementation. We show that Sergeyev’s
grossone system is unnecessary and vague, and that whatever con-
sistent subsystem could be salvaged is subsumed entirely within a
stronger and clearer system (IST). Lou Kauffman, who published
an article on a grossone, places it squarely outside the historical
panorama of ideas dealing with infinity and infinitesimals.
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2 AG, MK, TK, AND SK
1. Grossone olympics
In the summer of 2015, some of us were approached by an editor
of The Mathematical Intelligencer (TMI) with a request to respond
to a piece of what they felt was pseudo-science, published without
their knowledge in TMI. As noted in [Dauben et al. 2015, p. 393],
I. Grattan-Guinness argued that “the demarcation between science and
pseudo-science is not clearly drawn.” While agreeing with Grattan-
Guinness, in the present article we argue that in some cases the de-
marcation is drawn clearer than in others.
Yaroslav Sergeyev has developed a positional system for infinite num-
bers in numerous articles over the past decade. By 2015, MathSciNet
listed 19 such articles, starting with [Sergeyev 2003]. His “Olympic
Medal” note [Sergeyev 2015a] in TMI purports to be an application
of his grossone system to ranking countries lexicographically according
to the number of gold, silver, and bronze medals they earned in the
olympics. Sergeyev’s system is closely related to the field of rational
functions in one variable and to the classical Levi-Civita field, with a
non-Archimedean structure provided by a suitable lexicographic order-
ing (a more detailed comparison with the Levi-Civita fields appears in
Section 4.1).
Sergeyev appears to be making claims of significant progress in the
field of nonstandard models. The reaction of the experts to Sergeyev’s
claims has been lukewarm. Joel David Hamkins, a leading authority on
mathematical logic and foundations, reacted as follows to Sergeyev’s
claims: “It seems to me that there is very little that is new in this topic,
and basically nothing to support the grand claims being made about
it.” [Hamkins 2015] In this text, we will analyze Sergeyev’s claims in
more detail.
Shamseddine’s group has used Levi-Civita fields to develop computer
implementations exploiting infinite numbers (see Section 4.2), without
engaging in the sort of rhetorical flou artistique that envelopes a typical
Sergeyev performance. Pure and applied mathematicians may some-
times use different standards of rigor but Sergeyev’s case is a rather
different problem.
Nonstandard models of arithmetic were developed as early as 1933
by Skolem using purely constructive methods (in particular not rely-
ing on any version of the axiom of choice); see e.g., [Skolem 1933],
[Skolem 1934], [Skolem 1955], and [Kanovei, Katz & Mormann 2013,
Section 3.2].
Conservative extensions of the Peano axioms (PA) were studied in
[Kreisel 1969] and [Henson, Kaufmann & Keisler 1984]. Subsequently
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[Henson & Keisler 1986] described both a family of nonstandard ver-
sions of PA itself, and n-th order PA for different values of n, that are
conservative extensions of PA itself and respectively n-th order PA (see
Proposition 2.3 there), and also nonstandard versions containing addi-
tional stronger saturation axioms, that are not conservative extensions
(see Theorem 3.2 there). All of these theories are conservative with
respect to ZFC, as is IST (see Section 6).
[Avigad 2005] showed how to use weak theories of nonstandard arith-
metic to treat fragments of calculus and analysis. If (as apparently
claimed in [Lolli 2015]) what Sergeyev is attempting to do is develop
such nonstandard models, he is certainly doing it without acknowledg-
ing prior work in the field.
Contrary to Sergeyev’s earlier announcements, Nobel Prize laureate
Robert Aumann will not be attending Sergeyev’s june ’16 meeting in
Italy.
2. Transfering the sine function
A few years ago, one of the authors asked Sergeyev through email
what the sine of his grossone was, and he replied that it is
sin(grossone).
The author in question did not have the heart to ask Sergeyev what
sin2(grossone) + cos2(grossone)
is, and how exactly his “infinity computer” can know it other than
being told case-by-case about every possible identity in mathematics.
The point is that neither the field of rational functions nor Sergeyev’s
grossone system possesses a transfer principle (see below) or any equiv-
alent procedure.
In his list of areas where his ideas are claimed to be potentially
fruitful, Sergeyev mentions differential equations. Surely for this he
will need to know that the sine function is defined on the extended
system with its usual properties. This is what makes the question
about sin(grossone) crucial.
The transfer principle is a type of theorem that, depending on the
context, asserts that rules, laws or procedures valid for a certain num-
ber system, still apply (i.e., are “transfered”) to an extended number
system. Thus, the familiar extension Q ⊆ R preserves the property of
being an ordered field. To give a negative example, the extension
R ⊆ R ∪ {±∞}
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of the real numbers to the so-called extended reals does not preserve
such a property. The hyperreal extension
R ⊆ ∗R
preserves all first-order properties, including the trigonometric iden-
tity sin2 x+cos2 x = 1 (valid for all hyperreal x, including infinitesimal
and infinite values of x ∈ ∗R). For a more detailed discussion, see the
textbook Elementary Calculus [Keisler 1986].
The revolutionary idea that there does exist a system, sometimes
called hyperreal numbers, satisfying such a transfer principle is due to
the combined effort of [Hewitt 1948], [ Los´ 1955], and [Robinson 1961],
and has roots in Leibniz’s Law of continuity and his distinction be-
tween assignable and inassignable numbers; see [Katz & Sherry 2012],
[Katz & Sherry 2013], [Bair et al. 2016], [Bascelli et al. 2016], as well
as [B laszczyk et al. 2016a]. We will provide an explanation of the ex-
tension R ⊆ ∗R in Section 5.
Sergeyev sometimes grudgingly acknowledges the debt to Robinson.
However, in many publications Sergeyev unfortunately presents the
idea as his own, as noted by Vladik Kreinovich in his MathSciNet re-
view of Sergeyev’s book [Kreinovich 2003]. Peter W. Day’s review of
Sergeyev’s article at [Day 2006] mentions the connection to the transfer
principle, lacking in Sergeyev’s system. Additional critical reviews are
[Zlatosˇ 2009] and [Kutateladze 2011].
Sergeyev himself introduces his symbol for infinity in the following
terms:
A new infinite unit of measure has been introduced for
this purpose as the number of elements of the set N of
natural numbers. It is expressed by the numeral O1 called
grossone. It is necessary to note immediately that O1
is neither Cantor’s ℵ0 nor ω. Particularly, it has both
cardinal and ordinal properties as usual finite natural
numbers [Iudin, Sergeyev & Hayakawa 2012, p. 8101].
It is easy to detect serious logical problems with such a definition.
Sergeyev’s claim that his O1 has both cardinal and ordinal properties is
a purely declamative pronouncement. A reader might have expected
such a claim in a refereed mathematical periodical to be justified by
a clever definition, but it is not. As it stands, Sergeyev’s claim is
merely a thinly veiled admission of an inconsistency, couched in an
attempt to dress up a bug to look like a feature. Similarly, Sergeyev’s
attempted definition of O1 as somehow “the number of elements of the
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set N” contradicts other passages where O1 is included as a member
of N, resulting in an embarrassing circularity.1
The point we wish to emphasize is that the plausibility that such a
scheme might actually work after being sufficiently cleaned-up of super-
fluous pathos2 (including inconsistencies), is entirely due to Robinson’s
insights implementing Leibniz’s ideas about the distinction between as-
signable and inassignable numbers, on the one hand, and implementing
Leibniz’s law of continuity as the transfer principle, on the other.
In his writings, Sergeyev introduces his grossone, announces that it
is infinite, and blithely assumes that anything algebraic, or even from
analysis, that can be done with ordinary numbers can be done when
the grossone is adjoined. Such mathematical assertions require proof,
which are lacking in the analyzed note.
3. Debt to Robinson
The tendency to give insufficient credit to Robinson is clearly on
display in the “Olympic medal” as the reference to Robinson’s theory
is concealed in an obscure phrase in such a way that an uninformed
reader will be unable to gauge its significance.
For the benefit of such a reader, we provide the following clarifi-
cation. As far as providing a lexicographic ordering for the olympic
medals are concerned, it would be sufficient to take the grossone to be
equal to a number p greater than the total of all the medals attrib-
uted at the olympics, for example p equal a million, and work with
number representation in base p. Then obviously p will satisfy all the
usual rules governing finite numbers, because p itself is a finite number.
However, Sergeyev’s system is obviously not tailor-made for the games.
Rather, the alleged significance of Sergeyev’s system is its purported
applicability to a broad range of scientific problems, without any apri-
ori limitation on the size of the sample. For this reason he wishes to use
an infinite grossone value for p. In fact, the ordinary rational numbers
suffice for this purpose, as we explain in Section 7.
This is where his (pseudo)mathematical claims become questionable.
His framework presupposes a number system which properly extends
the usual one, yet obeys the usual laws, i.e., a transfer principle (see
Section 2). But Sergeyev’s system does not obey a transfer principle in
any mathematically identifiable form, as Sergeyev appears to acknowl-
edge in his sin(grossone) comment. The grossone calculator will be
able to compute values necessary for scientific work only to the extent
1See further on circularity of Sergeyev’s definitions in footnote 5.
2The English word pathos is etymologically related to piα´θoς , passion.
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that one or another version of the transfer principle is successfully im-
plemented. While Robinson’s system does obey a transfer principle,
Sergeyev is sparing in acknowledging his debt to Robinson.
Thus, in his keynote address in Las Vegas ’15, Sergeyev declares that
The new computational methodology is not related to
the non-standard analysis and gives the possibility to
execute computations of a new type simplifying fields
of Mathematics where the usage of infinity and/or in-
finitesimals is required. [Sergeyev 2015b] (emphasis added)
This strikes us as a somewhat economical way of acknowledging intel-
lectual indebtedness. It is as if someone proclaimed himself to be the
inventor of relativity theory and declared that his “methodology is not
related to” the work of Albert Einstein.
Sergeyev’s infringement on Robinson’s framework appears to be tol-
erated by the decision-makers in the mathematics community, in a way
that would not be tolerated if the infringement were in a field like dif-
ferential geometry or Lie theory. An infringement upon Robinson’s
framework is tolerated at least in part because the field created by
Robinson has been marginalized, not least through the (combined) ef-
forts of Paul Halmos and Errett Bishop (see e.g., [Katz & Katz 2011],
[Katz & Katz 2012], [Kanovei, Katz & Schaps 2015]), and of Connes
(see [Kanovei, Katz & Mormann 2013], [Katz & Leichtnam 2013]). As
a result, a number of Robinson’s students were unable to obtain posi-
tions at PhD-granting institutions in the 1970s. An additional factor
seems to be Robinson’s apparent insistence that logic has to take a
more prominent place in graduate programs in mathematics, provok-
ing animosity on the part of some mathematicians.
Robinson’s framework is a fruitful modern research area that has
attracted many researchers. Thus, Terry Tao developed certain ar-
guments on approximate groups exploiting ultraproducts that would
be difficult to paraphrase without them. The ultraproducts form a
bridge between discrete and continuous analysis, and enable a unified
framework for a treatment of both Hilbert’s fifth probem and Gromov’s
theorem on groups of polynomial growth; see [Tao 2014] for details.
4. Comparison with work by other scholars
In this section we will compare Sergeyev’s work with that of other
scholars, in chronological order.
4.1. Levi-Civita fields. David Tall used Levi-Civita fields under the
name superreal to popularize teaching calculus via infinitesimals in
THE MATHEMATICAL INTELLIGENCER FLUNKS THE OLYMPICS 7
[Tall 1979]. Levi-Civita fields is a classical topic with a long history.
It was studied in [Robinson & Lightstone 1975]. Sergeyev exploits his
grossone in place of the variable x in the Levi-Civita fields with the
lexicographic ordering, but comments that
Levi-Civita numbers are built using a generic infini-
tesimal ε . . . whereas our numerical computations with
[in]finite quantities are concrete and not generic. [Sergeyev 2015c,
p. 2] (emphasis added)
Two years earlier, Sergeyev compared the concrete grossone numeral
to Levi-Civita in the following terms (we make no attempt to correct
the grammar):
5 At the first glance the numerals (7) can remind num-
bers from the Levi-Civita field (see [20]) that is a very
interesting and important precedent of algebraic ma-
nipulations with infinities and infinitesimals. However,
the two mathematical objects have several crucial differ-
ences. They have been introduced for different purposes
by using two mathematical languages having different
accuracies and on the basis of different methodological
foundations. In fact, Levi-Civita does not discuss the
distinction between numbers and numerals. His num-
bers have neither cardinal nor ordinal properties; they
are build [sic] using a generic infinitesimal and only its
rational powers are allowed; he uses symbol ∞ in his
construction; there is no any numeral system that would
allow one to assign numerical values to these numbers;
it is not explained how it would be possible to pass from
. . . a generic infinitesimal h to a concrete one (see also
the discussion above on the distinction between num-
bers and numerals). In no way the said above should
be considered as a criticism with respect to results of
Levi-Civita. The above discussion has been introduced
in this text just to underline that we are in front of two
different mathematical tools that should be used in dif-
ferent mathematical contexts. [Sergeyev 2013, p. 10671,
note 5] (emphasis added)
Sergeyev’s use of the terms numeral (both as adjective and noun) and
numerical is vague. Certainly real numbers cannot be used in computer
implementations, and one needs to work instead with a specific repre-
sentation such as decimals. Shamseddine and his colleagues are surely
aware of this in their work with the Levi-Civita fields (see Section 4.2).
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Sergeyev has a talent for turning pathos3 into patent. Affected pathos
was also characteristic of the superior ideology of the former Soviet
Union where he was raised. Sergeyev seems to have learned the lesson
of the rhetorical effectiveness of superior ideology. Levi-Civita may have
done the same mathematics a hundred years earlier than Sergeyev, but
the former says a mere “x” and the latter says a superior “numeral,”
ergo the latter is on so much higher an ideological plane.
4.2. Shamseddine’s work on Levi-Civita fields. A group of re-
searchers around K. Shamseddine have been developing software based
on the Levi-Civita field for handling certain calculations with infin-
ity and infinitesimals; see e.g., the article [Shamseddine 2015] and
http://www.bt.pa.msu.edu/index_cosy.htm
These scholars typically refrain from assorting their work with the
kind of rhetoric that typically accompanies a Sergeyev performance,
such as:
(1) Sergeyev does not acknowledge properly indebtedness to Robin-
son, particularly in the matter of the transfer principle (see
Section 2), painting himself as a pioneer in the area.
(2) Sergeyev does not acknowledge properly that what he is working
with is a version of the classical Levi-Civita fields, seeking to
emphasize what he claims to be the novelty of his system.
(3) Sergeyev seeks to spice up his writing with an assortment of col-
orful principles that have little bearing on an actual computer
implementation, such as his stylized insistence on the part being
less than the whole.
With regard to this last point, [Benci & di Nasso 2003] developed a
mathematical theory of numerosities to express this idea mathemati-
cally, but its Sergeyevan incarnation seems to have little mathematical
content.
4.3. Kauffman on O1 . L. Kauffman is a leading topologist today. The
Kauffman bracket [Kauffman & Lins 1994] is a staple of 3-manifold
invariants. His article “Infinite computations and the generic finite”
[Kauffman 2015a] uses Sergeyev’s notation O1 . Sergeyev managed to
cite this recent paper of Kauffman’s already in three texts. Thus,
Sergeyev sends the reader to Kauffman (and other texts) “In order
to see the place of the new approach in the historical panorama of
ideas dealing with infinite and infinitesimal” [Sergeyev 2016, p. 24].
However, Kauffman himself clearly distances himself from Sergeyev’s
“methodology” in the following terms:
3See our etymological comment in footnote 2.
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In my paper about the Grossone, I point out that the
logic of this formalism is identical (in my version) to
using 1 + x + x2 + . . . + xG as a finite sum with G
a generic positive integer. One can then manipulate
the series and look at the limiting behaviour in many
cases. There is no need to invoke any new concepts
about infinity. This point of view may be at variance
with the interpretations of Yaroslav [Sergeyev] for his
invention, but I suggest that this is what is happening
here. [Kauffman 2015b]
In no way can Kauffman’s work or comments be interpreted as sup-
port for Sergeyev. Nor does Kauffman place Sergeyev “in the histori-
cal panorama” etc., contrary to Sergeyev’s claim. Quite the opposite,
Kauffman writes that “[t]here is no need to invoke any new concepts
about infinity,” thereby placing Sergeyev squarely outside a “historical
panorama of ideas dealing with the infinite.”
5. The hyperreal extension
In an approach to analysis within Robinson’s framework, one works
with the pair R ⊆ ∗R where R is the usual ordered complete Archimedean
continuum, whereas ∗R is a proper extension thereof. A proper exten-
sion of the real numbers could be called a Bernoullian continuum,
in honor of Johann Bernoulli who was the first systematically to use
an infinitesimal-enriched continuum as the foundation for analysis. For
historical background see [Borovik & Katz 2012], [Bair et al. 2013], [Bascelli et al. 2014],
[Kanovei, Katz & Sherry 2015]. The extension ∗R obeys the transfer
principle (see Section 2).
The field ∗R is constructed from R using sequences of real numbers.
The main idea is to represent an infinitesimal by a sequence tending to
zero. One can get something in this direction without reliance on any
nonconstructive foundational material. Namely, one takes the ring of
all sequences, and quotient it by the equivalence relation that declares
two sequences to be equivalent if they differ only on a finite set of
indices.
The resulting object is a proper ring extension of R, where R is
embedded by means of the constant sequences. However, this object is
not a field. For example, it has zero divisors. But if one quotients it
further in such a way as to obtain a field (by extending the kernel to
a maximal ideal), then the quotient will be a field, called a hyperreal
field.
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To motivate the construction further, it is helfpul to analyze first the
construction of R itself using sequences of rational numbers. Let QN
C
denote the ring of Cauchy sequences of rational numbers. Then
R = QNC/MAX (5.1)
where “MAX” is the maximal ideal in QN
C
consisting of all null se-
quences (i.e., sequences tending to zero).
The construction of a Bernoullian field can be viewed as refining the
construction of the reals via Cauchy sequences of rationals. This can
be motivated by a discussion of rates of convergence as follows. In
the above construction, a real number u is represented by a Cauchy
sequence 〈un : n ∈ N〉 of rationals. But the passage from 〈un〉 to u
in this construction sacrifices too much information. We seek to re-
tain some of the information about the sequence, such as its “speed of
convergence.” This is what one means by “relaxing” or “refining” the
equivalence relation in the construction of the reals from sequences of
rationals.
When such an additional piece of information is retained, two dif-
ferent sequences, say 〈un〉 and 〈u
′
n
〉, may both converge to u ∈ R, but
at different speeds. The corresponding “numbers” will differ from u by
distinct infinitesimals. If 〈un〉 converges to u faster than 〈u
′
n
〉, then the
corresponding infinitesimal will be smaller. The retaining of such ad-
ditional information allows one to distinguish between the equivalence
class of 〈un〉 and that of 〈u
′
n
〉 and therefore obtain distinct hyperreals
infinitely close to u. For example, the sequence 〈 1
n2
〉 generates a smaller
infinitesimal than 〈 1
n
〉.
A formal implementation of the ideas outlined above is as follows.
Let us present a construction of a hyperreal field ∗R. Let RN denote the
ring of sequences of real numbers, with arithmetic operations defined
termwise. Then we have
∗R = RN/MAX (5.2)
where “MAX” is a suitable maximal ideal. What we wish to empha-
size is the formal analogy between (5.1) and (5.2). In both cases, the
subfield is embedded in the superfield by means of constant sequences.
We now describe a construction of such a maximal ideal exploiting
a suitable finitely additive measure m. The ideal MAX consists of all
“negligible” sequences 〈un〉, i.e., sequences which vanish for a set of
indices of full measure m, namely,
m
(
{n ∈ N : un = 0}
)
= 1.
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Here m : P(N) → {0, 1} (thus m takes only two values, 0 and 1)
is a finitely additive measure taking the value 1 on each cofinite set,4
where P(N) is the set of subsets of N. The subset Fm ⊆ P(N) consisting
of sets of full measure m is called a free ultrafilter. These originate with
[Tarski 1930]. The construction of a Bernoullian continuum outlined
above was therefore not available prior to that date.
The construction outlined above is known as an ultrapower construc-
tion. The first construction of this type appeared in [Hewitt 1948],
as did the term hyper-real. The transfer principle (see Section 2) for
this extension is an immediate consequence of the theorem of  Los´; see
[ Los´ 1955].
6. A detailed technical report on GOT
The analysis presented in this section is an extension of the re-
port [Gutman & Kutateladze 2008]. We formulate our analysis in the
framework of Nelson’s Internal Set Theory (IST) first presented in
[Nelson 1977].
The difference between Nelson’s approach and Robinson’s can be
illustrated in the context of the underlying number system as fol-
lows. Robinson extended the real number field to a hyperreal number
field with infinitesimals (for example, by the ultrapower approach of
Section 5). In contrast with Robinson’s approach, Nelson proceeded
axiomatically and revealed both infinitesimals and illimited numbers
within the real number field itself.5 To this end, Nelson introduced a
new one-place predicate “to be standard” together with the appropriate
axioms. Both Nelson’s and Robinson’s theories are conservative exten-
sions of the traditional foundational framework of the Zermelo–Fraenkel
set theory. For further discussion see [Katz & Kutateladze 2015].
6.1. Logical status of Sergeyev’s theory. Sergeyev’s reasoning is
not only informal but often vague and inaccurate. The inaccuracies
include his definition of the grossone as “the number of elements in set
4For each pair of complementary infinite subsets of N, such a measure m “de-
cides” in a coherent way which one is “negligible” (i.e., of measure 0) and which is
“dominant” (measure 1).
5This point seems to have escaped Sergeyev, who claims it to be an advantage
of the grossone system that the infinite numbers are found within N, allegedly
unlike nonstandard analysis; see [Calude & Dinneen 2015, p. 95, note 3]. Elsewhere
Sergeyev claims that, on the contrary, O1 is “the number of elements in N”, leading
to a circularity already mentioned in footnote 1.
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of natural numbers” (which may appeal to the uneducated but math-
ematically speaking is nonsensical), as well as his delphic pronounce-
ments as to “the whole being greater than the part” and the distinction
between “numbers and numerals” (see Section 4.1). Such superfluous
PATHOS needs to be removed before a consistent theory can be iden-
tified. A reader with some mathematical culture can give formal shape
to Sergeyev’s postulates, as done in [Gutman & Kutateladze 2008] to
some extent. The result is a formal theory of signature
S =
{
=,∈,O1
}
(here ∈ is the membership relation while O1 is the grossone). We will
abbreviate the theory as GOT \PATHOS. Here “GOT” stands for
GrossOne Theory, while “PATHOS” alludes to the inconsistencies of
Sergeyev’s system and his efforts to sweep them under the rug by means
of le flou artistique via affected pathos or passionate enthusiasm; see
Section 4.1. Thus, GOT \PATHOS is the axiomatic formal theory in
the language of signature S whose axiomatic background is given by all
of Sergeyev’s postulates, both explicitly stated and implicitly assumed
in his papers.
Fact 6.1. Each axiom of GOT \PATHOS is a trivial consequence of
the axioms of any classical nonstandard set theory, provided O1 is un-
derstood as the factorial of an infinitely large integer.
This is shown in [Gutman & Kutateladze 2008]. In particular, the
axioms of GOT \PATHOS are easily proven in Nelson’s IST, with O1
evaluated as the factorial of an arbitrary infinitely large natural num-
ber. Therefore,
Fact 6.2. The theory GOT \PATHOS is weaker than IST.
By definition, the theory is weaker whenever is has fewer theorems.
Note that, for formal theories, weaker does not mean worse; nor does
stronger mean better. For instance, a theory whose theorems are all
the statements, i.e., an inconsistent theory, is the strongest one, but it
is hardly the best one. Nevertheless, in certain circumstances, a weaker
theory cannot be regarded as new as compared to a stronger theory.
Fact 6.3. GOT \PATHOS is not a new theory.
Indeed, GOT \PATHOS is weaker than a well-known theory, IST,
and moreover, the axioms of GOT \PATHOS are easily proven in IST.
Consequently, any reasoning within GOT \PATHOS can be automati-
cally converted into the corresponding and almost identical reasoning
in IST. In particular, GOT \PATHOS cannot prove any new result,
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since each result proven in GOT \PATHOS is already a result of a well-
known theory. Actually, even proofs within GOT \PATHOS cannot be
new, since every such proof is almost identical to an automatically
produced proof in a well-known theory.
Fact 6.4. GOT \PATHOS is dramatically weaker than IST.
It suffices to note that IST features a powerful and fruitful tool known
as the Transfer Principle (see Section 2), which is absent from the
theory GOT \PATHOS. In addition, GOT \PATHOS has no analogs
of Idealization and Standardization Principles, which makes it almost
impossible to prove any serious assertion in GOT \PATHOS without
appealing to informal or implicit assumptions.
Fact 6.5. Consistency of GOT \PATHOS is not justified by its origi-
nator.
In many of Sergeyev’s papers, one cannot find a single attempt for-
mally to justify the consistency of the grossone theory. Only due to
[Gutman & Kutateladze 2008] do we know that GOT \PATHOS is con-
sistent relative to IST (see also [Vakil 2012]). Furthermore, employing
the fact that IST is consistent relative to ZFC (see Nelson’s article
[Nelson 1977]) and that ZFC is consistent relative to ZF (a result of
Goedel’s; see his constructible universe [Goedel 1938]), we may con-
clude that GOT \PATHOS is consistent relative to the standard set
theory. (This is however not surprising, since GOT \PATHOS is weaker
than a well-known relatively consistent theory.)
It is good to know which facts a theory can prove, but for a the-
ory to be useful it also very important to know which facts it cannot
prove. To become a generally accepted legitimate mathematical tool,
a theory should be unable to prove strange or pathological results. The
corresponding formal property of a theory is called conservativity.
By definition, a theory T* of signature S* is a conservative extension
of a weaker theory T with smaller signature S whenever T* has exactly
the same theorems in signature S as T has. Suppose that we have a
generally accepted theory T (say, ZFC) and let a new theory T* (say,
IST) extend T and introduce new primary notions (in our example, the
notion of standard set). The fact that T* is a conservative extension
of T means the following: if T* allows us to prove some result R and R
does not involve new primary notions, then R is not pathological, as it
can also be proven in the generally accepted theory T. Therefore, any
conservative extension of a customary theory can be (and should be)
accepted as a legitimate mathematical tool. Namely, it has the same
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deduction strength and every sensible fact it can prove can be proven
by usual means, without any new axioms or new notions.
IST is known to be a conservative extension of ZFC, as shown by
Powell’s theorem presented in [Nelson 1977]. This nontrivial and very
important fact makes IST a generally accepted mathematical theory.
Fact 6.6. The question of conservativity of GOT \PATHOS is ignored
by its originator.
Again, only due to [Gutman & Kutateladze 2008] do we know that
GOT \PATHOS is weaker than IST, which, in its turn, is a conservative
extension of ZFC. Hence, so is GOT \PATHOS: if a set-theoretic fact
can be proven in GOT \PATHOS, it can also be proven in IST and,
thus, in ZFC. Without knowing this, even a consistent theory need not
be accepted.
Therefore, without employing nontrivial facts from contemporary
nonstandard analysis, Sergeyev’s reasoning remains a powerless, infor-
mal, weak theory with doubtful consistency, which cannot be generally
accepted due to its doubtful conservativity. On the other hand, if we
employ the facts from nonstandard analysis, the grossone theory turns
out to be merely a powerless and weak theory which cannot be regarded
as new.
6.2. Algorithmic status of Sergeyev’s theory. An algorithmic prob-
lem is the task of finding an algorithm which, given a constructive
object as input, produces a constructive object as output so that the
output is related to the input in a desired way, and this fact is provable
within a suitable theory under consideration. Therefore, solvability
and complexity of an algorithmic problem depends on the underlying
theory.
A solution to an algorithmic problem is an algorithm supplied with
a justification, i.e., with a proof (within a theory) of the assertion that
the algorithm works correctly and actually solves the problem. On the
other hand, a weaker theory has fewer proofs (which is a direct conse-
quence of the definition) and thus fewer solvable algorithmic problems.
Fact 6.7. Within a weaker theory, there are more unprovable and un-
decidable statements, more unsolvable algorithmic problems, while so-
lutions to solvable algorithmic problems are more complex.
Recalling that GOT \PATHOS is weaker than IST, we conclude the
following.
Fact 6.8. Each algorithmic problem unsolvable in IST is similarly un-
solvable in GOT \PATHOS; if an algorithmic problem has a complex
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solution in IST, it either has an even more complex solution in the
system GOT \PATHOS or is even unsolvable in GOT \PATHOS.
Furthermore, being a conservative extension of ZFC, IST has exactly
the same solvable set-theoretical problems as ZFC has. This circum-
stance allows us to derive the following fact.
Fact 6.9. Every unsolvable set-theoretical problem is unsolvable in
GOT \PATHOS; solvable set-theoretical problems are more complex or
even unsolvable in GOT \PATHOS.
There is a number of problems listed in [Gutman & Kutateladze 2008]
which encounter certain theoretical obstacles to finding an algorithmic
solution. Some of the problems are IST-specific, other are purely set-
theoretical or analytical. According to facts 6.8 and 6.9 we have the
following fact.
Fact 6.10. Each of the algorithmic problems enumerated in the article
[Gutman & Kutateladze 2008] is either more complex or even unsolv-
able in GOT \PATHOS.
6.3. Specific algorithmic problems concerning grossone. Within
GOT \PATHOS, the main tool is the “positional system with base O1 ”
in which the role of numerals is played by “multilevel polynomials”
in a single variable denoted O1 , with rational coefficients and expo-
nents. We will refer to these polynomials as grossnumerals. They are
multilevel in the sense that the exponents (power indices) need not
be numbers and may also be (multilevel) polynomials. Every gross-
numeral has finite height. Suitable formal definitions are presented
in [Gutman & Kutateladze 2008] (and are absent from Sergeyev’s pa-
pers).
If we restrict the height of grossnumerals to 1, we obtain the usual
polynomials in one variable. The algorithmic problems in the classical
calculus of such polynomials are far from being new. They are all
solved, long ago and completely. Anything new can occur only under
consideration of numerals having arbitrary finite height.
The set of grossnumerals cannot be called a “calculus” unless it is
supplied with a set of algorithms which implement such key operations
as reduction to canonical form and comparison. Without such algo-
rithms, one cannot speak of any computer realization of the calculus,
either.
The important point here is that the implementation of the basic
calculus operations in the set of grossnumerals encounters certain the-
oretical obstacles in IST and ZFC. According to Section 6.2, they en-
counter even more serious problems in the weaker GOT \PATHOS.
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The issues are thoroughly described in [Gutman & Kutateladze 2008],
and the main problem is as follows.
Fact 6.11. There is no known algorithm that, given grossnumerals x
and y, would determine which of the following holds true: x < y, x = y,
or x > y.
The latter problem must be solved in order to be able to speak of a
calculus, for otherwise we would not be able to perform such elementary
procedures as reducing similar terms or listing the terms in descending
order by their degree. Nevertheless, algorithmic solvability of these
procedures remains unknown. The corresponding hypothesis is based
on rather nontrivial facts on o-minimality and decidability of the order
structure of reals with exponent (see bibliographic references [11] and
[13] in [Gutman & Kutateladze 2008]).
Thus, currently there is no algorithm able to compare grossnumerals
or, for that matter, to check the inequalities
1 < O1O
1 −1
< 2.
Such an algorihm could hardly appear in any of Sergeyev’s papers.
Indeed, he provides the following characterisation of infinite numbers:
“Infinite numbers in this numeral system are expressed by numerals
having at least one grosspower grater [sic] than zero.” [Sergeyev 2007,
p. 60] But the grossexponent O1 −1 is indeed greater than zero; yet the
number O1O
1 −1 must be infinitely close to 1 if even a most rudimentary
form of the transfer principle (see Section 2) is to be satisfied. Yet
according to Sergeyev’s characterisation, O1O
1 −1
would turn out to be
“infinite”. Whenever Sergeyev’s assertions are specific enough to be
checked, one finds errors, including freshman calculus level errors.
This particular error appeared in “Blinking fractals” [Sergeyev 2007]
published in Chaos, Solitons, and Fractals, and was subsequently criti-
cized in [Gutman & Kutateladze 2008]. Sergeyev blinked and modified
his text in a number of online databases, so as to remove the error,
including its current ResearchGate version. As of 2015, no official cor-
rection whatsoever appeared in Chaos, Solitons, and Fractals.
This episode indicates how far removed the questions under consider-
ation are from any computer implementation. The comparison problem
is completely ignored in Sergeyev’s papers, and this is not surprising:
the problem is challenging even in IST, while in GOT \PATHOS it is
much more complex due to the absence of a suitable transfer principle.
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With the above taken into account, it becomes clear why all screen-
shots of a calculator presented in Sergeyev’s papers contain only gross-
numerals of height 1.
Fact 6.12. An actual grossone calculator does not exist.
Grossnumerals of height 1 are just ordinary polynomials of one vari-
able, and software for the corresponding calculus is commonplace nowa-
days. Contemporary symbolic computation packages provide much
more sophisticated machinery. The grossone theory is so poorly de-
signed and underdeveloped that a toy calculator is the only tool which
can be created on its basis.
7. Olympic ranks need no “numerical infinities”
In his note “The Olympic medals, ranks, lexicographic ordering, and
numerical infinities,” Sergeyev represents the basics of grossone theory
(as he does in each of his numerous papers containing the symbol O1 )
under the pretext of applying it to a “mathematical problem” related
to the lexicographic ranking method. The problem is caused by the
fact that, contrary to other known ranking methods, the lexicographic
method does not assign numerical ranks to various medal distributions,
it only orders them, i.e., determines which distribution is higher and
which is lower. Sergeyev suggests using grossnumerals as “numerical”
ranks of arbitrary medal distributions and emphasizes that his sug-
gestion solves the problem without upper bounds on the number of
medals awarded by a single country as well as on the number of the
medal classes (gold, silver, etc.).
We will demonstrate that the approach suggested by Sergeyev is
useless and any application of a theory of infinite numbers is overkill
for such a trivial aim. Indeed, the lexicographic order can be made
numerical in a very easy, reasonable, and practical way by means of
ordinary standard rational numbers.
Suppose that there are infinitely (but countably) many medal classes.
List them in descending order and associate with successive natural
numbers: 1 for “gold,” 2 for “silver,” 3 for “bronze,” 4, 5, 6, etc. for
all the rest. Each competitor can win an arbitrary finite set of medals
which can be encoded by a finite word with positive integers as “letters.”
For instance, the word w = 〈5, 0, 12, 1〉 encodes the fact that a com-
petitor has won 5 medals of class 1, 0 medals of class 2, 12 medals of
class 3, 1 medal of class 4, and 0 medals of any other class. The task
is to invent a practical method (an algorithm) of calculating a num-
ber R(w) for any word w in such a way that the equality R(u) > R(v)
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be equivalent to u ≻ v, where ≻ is the lexicographic order on words:
u ≻ v ⇔ u1 = v1, . . . , un−1 = vn−1, un > vn for some n.
(Here wn is the nth letter of a word w, with wn = 0 for n greater than
the length of w.)
The method proposed by Sergeyev consists in defining the “numeri-
cal” rank RS(w) of a word w = 〈w1, . . . , wL〉 of length L as the gross-
numeral
RS(w) = w1O1
L−1 + w2O1
L−2 + · · ·+ wL−1O1
1 + wLO1
0.
How useful is such a solution, however? Sergeyev regards RS(w) as
a “numerical” rank just because it is a “number” in the sense of his
grossone theory. Both theoretically and practically, this is nothing
but a mere replacement of a word 〈w1, . . . , wL〉 with a more bulky
expression of the form w1O1
L−1 + · · ·+ wLO1
0. This expression cannot
be written in any other numerical form and cannot be used in any
software other than the hypothetical “Infinity Calculator” based on
the mythical “Infinity Computer technology.”
We will now indicate a very simple and honest method of solving
the above-stated “problem.” Note first that, for the aim under consid-
eration, there is no need for any artificial numbers, and the standard
rational numbers with their standard order are undoubtedly sufficient.
This is so because, as is well known, every countable linear order em-
beds into the standard ordered set of rationals, and this is true, in
particular, for the lexicographically ordered set of words which repre-
sent medal distributions. So, the task is merely in choosing a specific
order-preserving rational encoding of the words. The encoding can be
as simple as follows. Given a word w = 〈w1, . . . , wL〉, set
R(w) =
L∑
n=1
2−(w1+···+wn−1+n−1)
wn∑
m=1
2−m.
Here R(w) ∈ [0, 1) is the rational number whose binary representation
(representation in the positional numeral system with base 2) has the
form
0 .11...1︸ ︷︷ ︸
w1 ones
011...1︸ ︷︷ ︸
w2 ones
0 . . . 011...1︸ ︷︷ ︸
wL ones
.
It is an easy exercise to show that the encoding R meets the required
condition, i.e., assigns greater ranks R(w) to lexicographically greater
words w. Note also that medal distributions are uniquely (and eas-
ily) determined by their numerical ranks. It is also worth observing
that R reflects certain emotional aspects related to medals wins: the
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awarding of the first medal of a given class is felt as a more exciting
and significant achievement than awarding the second one, and so on.
This circumstance results in the fact that the medal distributions with
close numerical ranks are also “psychologically” close.
As an illustration, we present the 2014 Winter Olympics medal table
of competitors (in lexicographic order) and their medal distributions
supplemented with the corresponding exact binary ranks, and approx-
imate decimal ranks.
2014 Winter Olympics medal table
Country Medals Binary Decimal
Russia 13 11 9 0.11111111111110111111111110111111111 0.9999389
Norway 11 5 10 0.1111111111101111101111111111 0.9997520
Canada 10 10 5 0.111111111101111111111011111 0.9995114
United States 9 7 12 0.111111111011111110111111111111 0.9990196
Netherlands 8 7 9 0.11111111011111110111111111 0.9980392
Germany 8 6 5 0.111111110111111011111 0.9980311
Switzerland 6 3 2 0.1111110111011 0.9915771
Belarus 5 0 1 0.11111001 0.9726562
Austria 4 8 5 0.1111011111111011111 0.9686870
France 4 4 7 0.11110111101111111 0.9677658
Poland 4 1 1 0.11110101 0.9570312
China 3 4 2 0.11101111011 0.9350585
South Korea 3 3 2 0.1110111011 0.9326171
Sweden 2 7 6 0.11011111110111111 0.8745040
Czech Republic 2 4 2 0.1101111011 0.8701171
Slovenia 2 2 4 0.1101101111 0.8583984
Japan 1 4 3 0.1011110111 0.7412109
Finland 1 3 1 0.1011101 0.7265625
Great Britain 1 1 2 0.101011 0.6718750
Ukraine 1 0 1 0.1001 0.5625000
Slovakia 1 0 0 0.1 0.5000000
Italy 0 2 6 0.0110111111 0.4365234
Latvia 0 2 2 0.011011 0.4218750
Australia 0 2 1 0.01101 0.4062500
Croatia 0 1 0 0.01 0.2500000
Kazakhstan 0 0 1 0.001 0.1250000
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8. Publication venue
This rebuttal did not appear in the journal The Mathematical Intel-
ligencer where Sergeyev’s note originally appeared because five succes-
sive versions of our rebuttal were rejected by that journal, in spite of
at least one favorable referee report.
9. Conclusion
The Olympic medals ranking was considered in Sergeyev’s note in
The Mathematical Intelligencer without any serious mathematical treat-
ment. The note’s shortcomings include serious issues of attribution of
prior work.
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